A Contractor Badge and a Camera: Insider Threat Lessons From the Naval Base Ventura County Filming Charges

On October 14, 2026, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California announced that Todd Jeremy Senff, 46, of Camarillo, California, was charged with 14 federal misdemeanors for allegedly using his access as a civilian contractor to photograph and film sensitive military equipment and training exercises at Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC). He was scheduled to be arraigned that afternoon in federal court in downtown Los Angeles.

There is no security clearance, classified file, or foreign buyer in this case. There is a construction worker with a base credential and a camera. That is exactly why it matters to every Department of War (DoD) installation and every contractor that sends people onto one.

What Happened

According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office (these are allegations; Senff is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in court):

  • Senff worked for a Navy construction services contractor. NBVC awarded that company a three-year construction contract in September 2023, and Senff worked on about four projects under it.
  • Through that job, he obtained a credential granting access to portions of the base.
  • From June 2024 to September 2024, he allegedly used that access to enter restricted areas and photograph and film sensitive military equipment, airplanes, and training exercises.
  • He allegedly sent some of the photos and videos to associates, along with messages about military activities.
  • NBVC Point Mugu, which houses naval logistics and weapons-testing commands and provides direct access to the Point Mugu Sea Range, maintained posted signage stating that photography was prohibited.
  • He is charged with 11 counts of violating a defense property security regulation (up to one year in federal prison per count) and three counts of entering military property for an unlawful purpose (up to six months per count).
  • The FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) investigated the case.
Lessons for Every Insider Threat Program

1. A contractor credential is insider access. Insider threat programs often focus on cleared employees and privileged IT users. This case involves neither. Anyone holding a badge to a DoW installation, including trade, construction, and service workers employed by subcontractors, belongs inside the program’s scope.

2. Tie access to the work, and reconcile it often. Senff worked on about four projects under a multi-year contract. Credentials should map to the specific job sites and timeframes of active work. Regularly reconcile badges against current task orders and project schedules, and narrow or remove access when a project ends.

3. Posted rules need reinforcement. Point Mugu had signage prohibiting photography. Signs set the rule; they do not ensure it is followed. Pair them with briefings at badging, signed acknowledgments of photography and personal-device rules, and escort or supervision requirements in sensitive areas.

4. Presence outside the job is an indicator. The alleged conduct involved entering restricted areas over several months. Someone repeatedly appearing where their assigned work does not take them is a behavior worth flagging. Combine physical access records with coworker and supervisor reporting so patterns surface early, not after months of activity.

5. Bring vendors into the reporting loop. Installation security cannot see what a foreman or crew lead sees every day. Prime contractors and subcontractors need insider threat awareness training, a clear way to report concerns to installation security, and contract language that makes reporting an expectation.

How TMPC Helps

Our team brings more than 30 years of combined insider threat experience and the proprietary processes built from it. For 8 years, TMPC has delivered continuous counter-insider threat and user activity monitoring support to USSOCOM and JSOC, work that drove that program to a #1 ranking among 24 DoW (DoD) components by DCSA and DIA.

We help organizations:

  • Build or assess insider threat programs that cover contractor, subcontractor, and vendor personnel, not just employees
  • Integrate physical access data with user activity monitoring and behavioral indicators
  • Train contractor workforces to recognize insider threat indicators and report them through clear procedures

To talk with our team, contact info@tmpcinc.com or 813.524.6935.