On November 18, 2026, the Justice Department announced that a federal grand jury had indicted Igor D’iu, a Russian national, on charges tied to an alleged scheme to surveil and gather information about employees of a Silicon Valley technology and defense company. D’iu is charged, not convicted, and the allegations have not been proven. The case is a clear reminder that before an adversary gets inside a network, it often starts with the people who have access to it.
What happened
- D’iu is charged with conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government, acting as an agent of a foreign government without notice to the Attorney General, interstate stalking, and fraud in connection with identification documents.
- According to the indictment and supporting affidavit, he was recruited by co-conspirators through Telegram, traveled from Istanbul to Mexico City in June 2026, and entered the United States unlawfully that summer to carry out assignments targeting employees of a large technology and defense company with an office in Palo Alto, California.
- Co-conspirators allegedly told him his work was for “the Motherland” and directed him to gather information about the company because it was supplying weapons used against Russia in Ukraine.
- He allegedly bought laptops, phones, wireless networking equipment, and remote access software; photographed employees’ laptop screens at a coffee shop near the office; and positioned a laptop near the company so co-conspirators could remotely access it and attempt to collect information from employees nearby.
- His assignments allegedly expanded to searching for employees’ home addresses, including a senior executive’s. On or about September 3, he allegedly followed a female employee for nearly 30 miles toward San Francisco. She called 911 and was directed to a police station, and he abandoned the pursuit after she contacted an officer.
- Investigators intercepted packages containing a falsified California ID, an altered U.S. passport, and a Social Security card in an assumed name.
- In October, FBI agents recovered about $18,000 in cash, laptops, phones, two Russian passports, wireless equipment, and a notebook with 10 handwritten addresses, many matching employees’ homes, plus detailed profiles of at least three employees, including family members’ names, work histories, and “assessments of their strengths and weaknesses.”
- FBI Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky said: “No matter where you are or who you’re working for, justice will find you.”
Lessons for every insider threat program
- Your workforce is the target before your network is. Profiles that record an employee’s family, history, and “strengths and weaknesses” are the raw material for spotting and assessing people who could be pressured or recruited. Training should explain this stage plainly, so employees recognize that interest in them personally is an indicator, not just interest in files.
- The coffee shop down the street is part of your attack surface. Screens were allegedly photographed in a public place near the office, and a laptop was allegedly staged nearby to reach employees’ devices. Set clear rules for working on sensitive material in public, issue privacy screens, restrict auto-connecting to unknown networks, and watch for unexpected wireless activity around facilities.
- Make it easy to report being followed or approached. The employee in this case did the right thing in the moment. Programs should give staff a simple, known channel to report surveillance, unusual questions, or unexpected contacts, and should route those reports to security and counterintelligence quickly. Cleared contractors already have suspicious-contact reporting obligations; everyone else should be trained to the same habit.
- Shrink what is findable about your people. The alleged scheme relied on online searches for home addresses. Review what public records, data broker listings, and company materials reveal about employees and executives, and offer support to reduce that exposure, starting with those in the most sensitive roles.
- Fuse physical and digital indicators. This alleged operation mixed physical surveillance with attempts at technical collection. An insider threat hub that brings together physical security reports, HR information, and user activity and network data can connect a stalking report to unusual device or access activity, instead of leaving each in its own silo.
How TMPC helps
Our team brings more than 30 years of combined insider threat experience and the proprietary processes built from it. For 8 years, TMPC has delivered continuous counter-insider threat and user activity monitoring support to a DoW (DoD) customer, work that drove that program to a #1 ranking among 24 DoW components by DCSA and DIA.
- Insider threat program development and training, including awareness of targeting, spotting and assessment, and suspicious-contact reporting.
- Continuous user activity monitoring and analysis that gives investigators reliable records when a referral is needed.
- Insider threat hub support that brings physical security, HR, and technical indicators together for timely, well-documented decisions.
To talk with our team, contact info@tmpcinc.com or 813.524.6935.