$2.47 Million From Seized Wallets: Insider Threat Lessons From the Former FBI Agent’s Crypto Theft Plea

On November 5, 2026, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia announced that Patrick Steven Yaroch, 37, of Ashburn, Virginia, a former FBI agent, pleaded guilty to wire fraud and money laundering. He admitted using his access to systems that held cryptocurrency credentials collected during investigations to steal about $2.47 million in digital assets.

This case is a clear example of a trusted insider turning privileged access into personal gain. The access was legitimate. The use was not.

What happened
  • From 2017 to early 2025, Yaroch served in the FBI Boston Division on a squad focused on an adversarial nation-state.
  • From February 2025 to July 31, 2026, he worked in the FBI Counterintelligence and Espionage Division, with access to systems holding cryptocurrency credentials collected during investigations.
  • Starting no later than December 2024, he stole cryptocurrency from wallets belonging to investigation subjects, nation-state actors, and at least one government-created wallet used in an operation.
  • He made about 100 fraudulent transfers using credentials tied to 35 investigations, for total proceeds of about $2,474,380.66.
  • He exchanged the stolen assets for other cryptocurrencies and moved them through additional transactions to hide their source and ownership.
  • Between November 25, 2025, and January 13, 2026, he moved about $93,082 into one of his accounts and used the funds to pay credit cards, car payments, and other loans.
  • He planned to finance a new life abroad. He asked ChatGPT about maximizing investment profit and where to live in the EU, bought a vineyard in Portugal, gave power of attorney to Portuguese lawyers on June 15, 2026, and arranged travel to Portugal for September 2026.
  • According to the release, his actions compromised multiple investigations involving criminal groups and nation-state adversaries and exposed sources and methods.
  • Sentencing is scheduled for March 4, 2027. He faces up to 20 years in prison.
Lessons for every insider threat program
  1. Treat credential stores as crown jewels. Access to a private key is access to the money. Any system that holds wallet credentials, signing keys, or seized-asset data should require two-person control for every transfer, so no single user can both retrieve a credential and move funds.
  2. Compare access to assignment. Credentials tied to 35 separate investigations were used. User activity monitoring should baseline which cases, records, or projects each user is assigned to and flag access that spreads well beyond that scope.
  3. Reconcile holdings continuously, not annually. About 100 transfers took place over many months. Automated reconciliation of every custodial wallet against its expected balance turns each unauthorized outflow into an alert instead of an audit finding.
  4. Connect financial and life-event indicators to technical data. Paying down debts, buying property overseas, and planning a move abroad are behaviors that reporting programs and continuous evaluation are built to surface. They carry the most weight when an analyst can see them next to unusual system activity.
  5. Re-certify access at every role change. Insiders change jobs, squads, and divisions. Each move is a chance to confirm that a person’s access still matches their current duties and to remove what they no longer need.
How TMPC helps

Our team brings more than 30 years of combined insider threat experience and the proprietary processes built from it. For 8 years, TMPC has delivered continuous counter-insider threat and user activity monitoring support to a DoW (DoD) customer, work that drove that program to a #1 ranking among 24 DoW components by DCSA and DIA.

  • Counter-insider threat program design, assessment, and maturity support
  • User activity monitoring (UAM) analysis, triage, and referral
  • Data security audits and vendor threat mitigation

To talk with our team, contact info@tmpcinc.com or 813.524.6935.

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ABOUT TMPC

TMPC, Inc. delivers counter-insider threat, user activity monitoring, vendor threat mitigation, and cybersecurity services, backed by 8 years of continuous C-InT/UAM program support to a DoW (DoD) customer.

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