On November 16, 2026, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced that Huaisong Xiang, 30, of Jersey City, New Jersey, a former software engineer at Robinhood Markets, pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. Prosecutors said he used his access to nonpublic information about which crypto tokens Robinhood planned to list, and when, to trade ahead of the announcements.
No classified data or source code left the building. The asset he misused was timing: knowing what was coming before the market did.
Many insider threat programs focus on data leaving the network. This case is a reminder that misuse can happen without moving a single file: the insider simply acts on what he knows. Clear policy, access monitoring, and look-back reviews are what close that gap, whether the information is a token listing, a merger, or a contract award.
What happened
- In his role, Xiang had access to nonpublic information about whether and when Robinhood would add cryptocurrencies to Robinhood Crypto, its digital asset trading subsidiary.
- Between 2025 and 2026, he repeatedly bought perpetual futures tied to crypto tokens on Hyperliquid, a decentralized trading platform.
- He made those purchases before Robinhood publicly announced that each token would be listed on Robinhood Crypto.
- According to the government, he knew the listing information was confidential and breached his duty to Robinhood by trading on it.
- He profited $125,523 and agreed to forfeit that amount as part of his plea.
- The charge carries a maximum of 20 years in prison. Sentencing is scheduled for February 25, 2027.
- U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald said “corporate insiders will be held accountable” for trading on misappropriated information, regardless of the platform.
Lessons for every insider threat program
- Define sensitive information by access, not job title. Engineers who build release pipelines, feature flags, or configuration changes often see business decisions before leadership announces them. Restricted lists and trading policies should cover anyone whose systems expose that information.
- Write policies for today’s trading venues. The trades here were perpetual futures on a decentralized platform. A policy that covers only brokerage stock trades leaves derivatives, crypto, and offshore venues unaddressed. Name them explicitly, and require employees with access to sensitive release information to disclose accounts on those venues.
- Run look-back reviews after every material announcement. After each listing, launch, or award, review who accessed the information beforehand. Pairing those access logs with the announcement timeline narrows the field quickly when something looks wrong. Reviews done routinely also deter, because insiders know they happen.
- Treat repetition as the signal. One well-timed trade can be luck. A series of positions opened just before a series of announcements is a pattern, and patterns are what monitoring and analytics are built to find.
- Apply the same thinking to government work. For contractors, the equivalent is nonpublic contract award, source selection, budget, or program information. People who see it early, including IT and support staff, need the same awareness, controls, and monitoring.
How TMPC helps
Our team brings more than 30 years of combined insider threat experience and the proprietary processes built from it. For 8 years, TMPC has delivered continuous counter-insider threat and user activity monitoring support to a DoW (DoD) customer, work that drove that program to a #1 ranking among 24 DoW components by DCSA and DIA.
- Counter-insider threat program design, assessment, and maturity support
- User activity monitoring (UAM) analysis, triage, and referral
- Data security audits and vendor threat mitigation
To talk with our team, contact info@tmpcinc.com or 813.524.6935.
Get practical insider threat lessons like this every week: follow TMPC on LinkedIn.